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One of the motivations for establishing a European banking union was the desire to 
break the ties between national regulators and domestic financial institutions in 
order to prevent regulatory capture. The centralization of supervisory authority 
under the auspices of the European Central Bank aims to prevent conflicts of interest 
that can exist between national authorities and financial institutions operating in 
global markets. In particular, critics have pointed at regulatory leniency towards 
national champions, the protection and promotion of domestic regulatory standards 
at the disadvantage of foreign competitors or implicit encouragement to hold 
domestic sovereign bonds. One of the most glaring lessons of the recent crisis seems 
to be that elite failure – both on the side of the public authorities and the private 
sector – was the result of complacency, misjudgment and sometimes even outright 
manipulation that could have been avoided if supervision and regulation happened 
at a greater distance. By centralizing these functions at the European level, financial 
institutions will no longer be able to play their domestic advantage, or rely to the 
same extent on much criticized sources of proximity with regulators such as 
schooling and education, rotating doors or joint golf excursions.  
Breaking up the intricate relationships between national authorities and their 
financial institutions will help to prevent dysfunctional complacency in the future, 
but it also contains risks. Frequent interactions between public and private actors 
not only allow circulating technical information, they also help constitute social 
relationships where both parties agree on rights and obligations that may go beyond 
formal rules. As a consequence, they can produce public benefits that would be 
imperiled in the current proposals for centralized supervision.  
The aim of this policy letter is to detail such public benefits in order to counter 
discussions that focus only on conflicts of interest. It is informed by an analysis of 
how financial institutions interacted with policy-makers in the design of national 
bank rescue schemes in response to the banking crisis of 2008. 2                                                        1 Cornelia Woll is Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po Paris, where she directs the Max Planck 
Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies since 2012, and the Interdisciplinary 
Center for the Evaluation of Public Policy, LIEPP (2011-2014).  This note builds on the lecture “Power 
of collective inaction: Bank bail-outs in comparative perspectives”, delivered in the Policy Center 
Lecture Series at the Research Center SAFE on May 15, 2014.  
 Using this 
2The extensive study of crisis management in the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
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information, it discusses the possible benefits of close cooperation between financial 
institutions and regulators and analyzes these in the wake of a European banking 
union.  
1. The benefits of close ties 
Identifying conflicts of interest in order to purify public action is a theme that runs 
through policy-making, the media and academia alike. Much of it is common sense. 
Numerous reports have highlighted how decision-makers have failed to grasp the 
urgency of the crisis because stakeholders that had an interest in continuing 
business-as-usual reassured them. Regulation prior to the crisis was in many times 
inadequate because regulators insufficiently questioned the self-assessment of the 
industry. Pointing to the ties between regulators, supervisors and the financial 
industry, many have insisted that capture is at the origin of these problems.   
But the ties between public officials and industry representatives are social relations. 
They can be dysfunctional and lead to rent seeking, but they can also produce public 
benefits. Academic discussion has made very similar observations about social 
capital: it is at the base of criminal organizations such as the mafia but also 
constitutive of civic arrangements that help to promote economic development and 
democracy. It is thus important to distinguish between relationships that only serve 
particular private interests and those that provide public benefits. Since the 
discussion has excessively focused on mechanisms of regulatory capture, this note 
concentrates on the latter.   
Organizing regular and collective consultations with decision-makers from the 
financial sector and public authorities has three advantages. First, it helps to discuss 
and evaluate a joint interpretation of common challenges. In combination with 
independent data gathering and supervision, interactive public-private feedback on 
the situation of individual financial institutions can give key insights into current 
evolutions and future challenges. The necessity to obtain such collective feedback 
becomes clear in the discussion of systemic risks. It is now widely accepted that not 
just the behavior of individual institutions matters for financial stability, but also the 
ways in which they are connected. Despite concerted efforts to find objective ways 
to measure systemic risk, regulators will always deal with an inter-subjective 
element that affects how systemic risk situations play out: the psychology of 
investors on financial markets. The subjective interpretation of individual financial 
institutions can thus supplement hard data on interconnectedness.  
Second, collective private cooperation can help to limit public intervention in a crisis 
situation. Many governments sought to rely on private takeovers for distressed 
banks during the recent crisis and several aimed to encourage collective liquidation 
consortia. In essence, governments encouraged the financial sector to chip in to find 
a private solution for a failing competitor, as had been successfully experimented in                                                                                                                                                               
Germany, Ireland, and Denmark is published as: Cornelia Woll (2014) The Power of Collective Inaction: 
Bank Bailouts in Comparison. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
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response to the failure of Long-Term Capital Management in the United States in 
1998. In response to the recent crisis, several governments negotiated with their 
financial industry to establish joint rescue schemes. In France and Austria, liquidity 
was provided through a public-private arrangement, which grouped collateral of 
private banks backed by a public guarantee in order to issue securities that helped to 
keep domestic banks afloat: the Société de financement de l’économie française 
(SFEF) and the Österreichische Clearingbank AG (OeCAG). In Denmark, the Danish 
banking industry established the Danish Contingency Association for the support of 
distressed banks, which gathered fees for a collective guarantee and acted as an 
intermediary to the government for deposit guarantees and recapitalization, leading 
to extensive burden-sharing between the government and the financial industry. In 
all three cases, the willingness of the financial sector to engage collectively in order 
to stabilize the economy in times of crisis arguably reduced the extent to which the 
governments needed to commit taxpayer money.  
Third, collective discussion and cooperative arrangements create oversight 
mechanisms based on private sector knowledge that regulators cannot easily 
replace. The lack of detailed financial knowledge regulators had prior to and during 
the financial crisis has been repeatedly criticized. In one of the most extreme cases, a 
tape recording of senior executives at the failed Anglo-Irish bank reveals that the 
bank knowingly maneuvered the government into granting aid based on entirely 
imaginary numbers. While such strategies seem to have passed in bilateral business-
government negotiations, they are harder to imagine in a collective setting. Market 
actors work under similar conditions and face comparable constraints. They are thus 
well-equipped to judge the situations of their competitors. In situations where 
collective arrangements imply costs to all participants, this oversight can help to limit 
the existence of the aid in time. To cite an example, all major French banks accepted 
recapitalization in 2008 in order to avoid stigmatizing distressed institutions. When 
the scheme was extended in 2009 for a second round of recapitalization, two banks 
left arguing that the initial objective of stabilizing the economy was no longer at 
stake. This decision signaled that recapitalization had become an issue for the 
private interests of some, no longer for the financial stability of the industry as a 
whole.  
To summarize, in collective settings, close relations between the private sector and 
public authorities can create positive outcomes. They allow for the circulation of 
technical information and inter-subjective assessments, create the bedrock for 
public-private arrangements during times of crisis and enable collective oversight 
that can rely on industry expertise. As a result, they may produce publically 
supported intervention that is both cheaper and shorter than intervention designed 
and carried out by public authorities only. 
2. Prerequisites 
In advocating close interaction between the financial industry and public authorities, 
the tricky question is, of course, how to advocate cooperation in the public interest 
without encouraging ties that only serve private benefits. As mentioned above, one 
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key element is to structure public-private consultations as collective undertakings, 
not as bilateral relations. Financial institutions are necessarily concerned with their 
individual situation and will advance their point of view only in public discussions. 
The goal of collective public-private interactions is not to make them think in terms 
of public interest, but merely to signal how much the individual interests are tied to 
the collective well-being of the sector.  
In addition, it is necessary to encourage and formalize work relationships during fair 
weather in order to be able to rely on them in moments of crisis. The Danish 
Contingency Association was established by Danish banks in 2007, but had 
previously existed as a public guarantee fond initiated in 1994. When the Danish 
Contingency Association was put to test with the failure of Roskilde Bank in 2008, it 
quickly became clear that the bank would deplete the capacity of the fund. But the 
existing structure of cooperation enabled the industry to negotiate a rescue scheme 
with public authorities that would allow for the unwinding of Roskilde Bank and 
provide a response to the crisis of the entire industry. In Ireland, a handbook written 
for financial crisis management was simply left in the drawers when the economy 
unraveled in the fall of 2008. The bureaucratic guidelines were judged too 
complicated for the severity of the situation. The comparison indicates that modes 
of cooperation are more useful than precise instructions for future situations that 
are by definition uncertain.  
Finally, even the most tried cooperation mechanisms will fail when the interests of 
the participants diverge too much. To some degree, the success or failure can 
therefore be considered a fatality, since it depends on issues that may be unevenly 
spread: the size of individual institutions, the internationalization of their portfolios 
or their risk profile and exposure, for example. However, many of these elements are 
quite well understood and it is possible to organize consultation and cooperation 
mechanisms that take into account the homogeneity and heterogeneity of interests. 
Certain discussions will require a broad spread of representation, but others may be 
more helpfully dealt with in arenas that bring together only large commercial banks, 
investment funds, or saving banks, for example. However, it is necessary to break up 
sub-sections and integrate them into discussions that touch upon issues across the 
board, in order to avoid creating very entrenched sub-cultures in European finance.  
 
3. The future of banking union 
The challenge for European banking union is to transpose to the European level all 
the advantages of centralized supervision – and there are many – without destroying 
those parts of the social tissue at the domestic level that are actually working well. 
Although it might seem naïve or cynical to talk about corporate citizenship in the 
context of banking, it is important to communicate to the financial industry that they 
are not just the object of regulation. Financial institutions are also stakeholders in 
the economy that benefit from European arrangements and that have obligations 
beyond regulatory compliance. The European bank levy to support, ex ante, the 
resolution fund is a first and useful step in formalizing the idea that European 
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financial institutions are members of a community of fate.  
In addition, European authorities should try to construct consultative fora that bring 
together decision-makers of financial institutions on a regular basis. These 
discussions should serve to supplement relationships between the industry and 
regulators that will continue to exist at the domestic level. Rather than delegitimizing 
domestic ties as sources of “banking nationalism”, European authorities should draw 
on their strength to create an integrated framework with building blocks of 
consultative subsidiarity. Such a framework will be especially critical for the success 
of the upcoming Single Resolution Mechanism. When push comes to shove, the 
resolution of a significant financial institution needs to be handled over a weekend. 
Despite their sophistication, “living wills” alone are likely to prove insufficient as 
guidelines for action for resolution authorities in Brussels. It would be a blessing if 
public officials could fall back on existing networks and mobilize information from 
the private sector across Europe in moments of such urgency. For one thing is 
undisputed in current regulatory discussions: at some point a major banking failure is 
bound to happen.  
 
 
